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Summary  
 This report is a think-piece to inform ongoing policy development by the Welsh Government 
working in partnership with stakeholder groups. It synthesises evidence on the state of 
agriculture and rural areas in Wales with the available understanding of stages, timing and 
potential outcomes of the Brexit process, identifying implications and potential priorities.  
 Our scenario analysis suggests that the most likely changes in trading conditions would 
tend to disadvantage the competitive position of Welsh agriculture vis-à-vis its main current 
markets and trading competitors (particularly in sheep and beef). Further, we may 
anticipate generally reduced levels and scope of public funding by comparison with those 
the sector has enjoyed in recent years. However, within these challenging probable change 
scenarios, there are opportunities if farm businesses are enabled to respond adaptively. 
 Some farms and sectors face much greater challenges than others, which implies uneven 
structural change across significant areas:  
- a decline in the economic viability of sheep production is likely, with these farm 
businesses especially vulnerable to changes in both market access arrangements 
and public funding support – this could increase pressure on rural services;  
- accordingly, north and west Wales are likely to face stronger negative impacts than 
the south and east, where more potentially positive and diverse impacts can be 
expected among dairy, horticultural, mixed and other farm types. 
 How key food and forestry processors and retailers respond to the Brexit process, and their 
willingness to invest in Wales and Welsh products, will be an important factor. Their 
patterns of operation may change in response to shifting economic and market conditions.  
 Managing the challenges faced is key, to prevent undesirable impacts on natural capital, 
landscape quality and community identity. Three policy directions are recommended: 
- Fostering resilience in farm and other land management businesses; supporting 
successful adaptation, enhanced efficiency, diversification, adding value and inter-
generational transfer, as well as some moves from farming into other sectors; 
- Investing in longer-term partnerships between government, food retailers, rural 
service providers, and commercial lenders to promote stronger business networks 
and SME infrastructure across Wales; 
- Designing a future funding framework to support natural resource management and 
rural vitality in Wales. 
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Introduction  
The UK leaving the EU presents the Welsh agricultural sector and rural areas with important 
challenges and opportunities. To overcome the challenges and capitalise on the opportunities, 
the Welsh Government has called for all rural actors and stakeholders to work collaboratively 
to achieve its shared vision, as set out in recent policies and strategies. These include:  
 for agriculture: ‘a prosperous, resilient agriculture industry promoting Wales’ present 
and future well-being’ (WG, 2015b);  
 for the rural environment: ‘Healthy, resilient ecosystems underpinning our economy, 
health and well-being and (representing) an important part of our culture. They provide 
us with our food, clean water and air, the raw materials and energy for our industries 
and protect us against hazards, such as flooding and climate change’ (NRW, 2016);  
 for the Welsh economy and communities: ‘to be widely recognised as one of the best 
places in the world to live, to work and to thrive… a strong economy, not as an end in 
itself, but for the integral contribution it can make to the quality of life and the economic, 
social and environmental wellbeing of people and communities in Wales, placing 
sustainable development as our central organising principle’ (IWA, 2015); 
 for the process and outcomes of Brexit: ‘Wales can seize the opportunity to establish 
new ways of shaping the future in line with current best practice and (to) think 
inventively about new ways of doing things best suited to our needs’ (WG, 2017a). 
This report is the product of a short, reflective exercise, undertaken between June and 
November 2017, to provide some independent insight and ideas to help address these goals, 
through rapid analysis of literature and consideration of policy, expert and stakeholder 
opinions. Its objectives are to:  
1. Summarise ‘best estimates’ of the likely process and shape of Brexit, identifying clear 
scenarios that can be used to suggest impacts and outcomes. 
2. Review the state of Welsh rural areas at present in respect of their agricultural, 
environmental and socio-economic components and the role of current policies in 
shaping these and their inter-linkages. 
3. Consider how the ‘most likely’ identified Brexit scenarios would affect these assets and 
relationships.  
4. Identify key ingredients for a future strategy for rural Wales which can deliver its main 
overarching goals, in the face of these anticipated scenario impacts. 
The report is divided into five sections.  
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 Section 2 describes the likely shape and form of Brexit and considers potential 
scenarios for this exercise.  
 Section 3 analyses how rural areas would be affected by the scenarios discussed. 
 Section 4 summarises key points from Section 4 and compares scenario priorities. 
 Section 5 develops key policy principles and elements for the future. 
Also included is an Appendix, which summarises the state of Welsh rural areas: their 
agriculture, environment and rural socio-economic characteristics and trends. This work was 
conducted during a period of continuing evolution of UK-EU negotiations and related Brexit 
policy planning and development within the Welsh Government, working closely with a wide 
range of partners.  The author was given access to the outputs and deliberations of a range 
of relevant Welsh Government working groups and held meetings with officials and at intervals 
during the research period.  
Brexit Process and Scenarios  
The Brexit Process 
There are three key axes of variation for the Brexit process, and what it might mean for future 
UK and Wales policy and trends, as follows. 
1. Trade – the UK must determine its future trading relations with the EU and with third 
countries outside the EU, as part of the process of leaving the Single European Market. The 
outcome of this process could vary between a situation of ‘almost free’ trade with the EU, 
within or outside a customs union (i.e. with or without common external tariffs for third 
countries), versus a high agri-tariff position as a result of defaulting to a World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) ‘Most-Favoured Nation’ (MFN) trading model. MFN would mean new 
tariffs on UK-EU agricultural trade and on UK trade with other countries outside the EU, at 
least in the medium term. This could happen, for instance, if there is insufficient agreement by 
2019 between the UK and EU on the UK-EU trading position and/or the terms of any transition 
period.  
2. Future policy/funding for agriculture and rural areas – the UK and its devolved 
administrations will determine how much can be afforded, for agriculture, environmental 
management and rural development support once we are no longer within the framework of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The question is therefore how strong/large, and for 
what purposes, would a future public support budget be? Under the CAP, the scale of support 
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was largely EU-determined - how would priorities change, once determined by the UK or by 
Wales? 
3. The nature of the wider UK post-Brexit governance model and general economic 
situation, which will affect change in rural areas. Will the governance model be regulatory 
or de-regulatory? How far will it be devolved, and how many other challenges will arise from 
Brexit impacts? Current devolution in agri-rural affairs is dependent on a common supra-
national (EU) framework covering CAP resources, EU Structural Funding and the provisions 
of EU legislation on the environment, food safety and consumer welfare. Once this framework 
no longer applies, what might replace it? How might the wider impacts of Brexit affect the UK 
economy, public policy and finances?  
As the UK begins the process of negotiating the Brexit deal, UK Government Ministers are 
seeking a process of ‘roll-over’ in respect of much of environmental, food and agricultural 
policy; for at least 5 years after we have left the EU.  We can anticipate a fairly close translation 
and adoption of many of the basic instruments of EU legislation, including established 
regulations on the environment, and a proportion of those relating to agriculture and rural 
development, in the EU Withdrawal Bill.  
However, there has been a longstanding view in the UK Treasury and UK Government that 
the CAP does not best suit UK interests (e.g. Defra and HM Treasury, 2005). The UK’s official 
position on CAP reform has been that ‘Pillar 1’ direct farm payments, in particular, should be 
phased out as they fulfil no clear public policy role. It is therefore likely for moves in Whitehall 
to reduce the scope and scale of this kind of support to UK farms in future and reduce the 
amount of support that is going into any Pillar 1-style direct payments. However, unilateral 
removal by the UK without any counterbalancing change elsewhere would negatively affect 
our agri-trade position, and would undoubtedly affect sector viability, at least in the short term. 
The question remains as to how far the will of the UK Treasury might stand, against stronger 
support for continuing with some basic payment for the whole land-based agricultural sector, 
at least in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, after Brexit. 
Looking ahead, the full Brexit process will take more than two years:  
 the CAP will cease in the UK from April 2019 and elements of its support will be honoured 
up to 2022, but policy perhaps until 2025, during the anticipated ‘transition period’, may 
look rather like CAP but with a lower budget, most likely Pillar 1 step-wise cuts and a 
modestly rising Pillar 2, then… 
 a full domestic approach must be agreed for the four UK countries after transition, allowing 
some devolution in agri-rural policy within a national framework relating to UK trade policy, 
 
  
6 
as that becomes clearer. This might emerge in plans and proposals around 2021/2, for 
implementation once the transition phase ends;  
 there will be opportunities to amend some environmental/health legislation that is most 
relevant to farming and forestry, which can only be taken forward after 2019. However, 
PM speeches during 2017 and the recent White Paper on Brexit and the new EU 
partnership suggest this area will probably not be among the UK Government’s main 
legislative priorities during the transition phase. 
It is important to consider that the Brexit process will evolve in parallel, and perhaps in tension, 
with the next phase of EU CAP reform, scheduled for 2020. This is likely to deliver a smaller 
total CAP budget (not only due to UK withdrawal) and some simplification of the policy. The 
UK may also require specific new transitional policy tools and processes to manage the period 
of change. 
Scenarios for Brexit outcomes 
These scenarios are broadly consistent with those proposed by the Welsh Government’s own 
policy officials within the relevant areas of governance earlier in the post-referendum process. 
However some refinements have been made in light of political developments since then 
concerning: 
 the nature of a future trading situation – EU-UK and UK-other countries,  
 the scale and shape of future support to agriculture and rural development (the successor 
approach to CAP), and  
 the regulatory climate within UK public administration, which will in turn be affected by 
current and future economic conditions. 
Describing each briefly, in turn: 
Scenario 1 considers a situation where the UK succeeds in attaining a future (near) open 
market with the EU, such that no significant barriers to trade with our existing EU markets are 
erected, at least in the short-term before the UK seeks any freer-trade deals with third 
countries outside the EU. In the longer term, some barriers might be necessary as part and 
parcel of a broadening of trade relations with other countries, to prevent the UK becoming a 
conduit for tariff-free entry of goods from third countries into the EU market, or vice versa.  At 
the same time, this scenario supposes a significant reduction in domestic support for 
agriculture and rural development, over a period of (c.5) years.  This is combined with a 
supposition that the regulatory environment remains roughly as it is now, due to its close links 
to open markets with the EU (i.e. UK standards will need to be at parity with EU ones). 
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Scenario 2 assumes the same trading conditions as Scenario 1, but with a commitment by 
the UK Government to continue with similar-to-current levels of support to agriculture and rural 
development. In many ways this is as near to a ‘status quo’ scenario as is possible to envisage 
emerging from the Brexit process. We may consider it the least likely scenario, in the wider 
policy context in which the UK is seeking some dividend from its departure from the EU and 
yet the economy remains somewhat uncertain, thus discouraging significant growth and 
investment. As with Scenario 1, open UK-EU trade relations would imply limited scope for UK 
de-regulation. 
Scenario 3 considers perhaps the most drastic changes for Wales, due to a combination of 
reduced trade with the EU for agricultural products arising from the imposition of tariffs on key 
farm products (assumed to be the ‘losses’ agreed as part of a deal enabling ‘priority’ UK 
competitive trade sectors to retain open trading conditions, in return), and reduced public 
support for agriculture and rural development. De-regulation would also be more possible in 
respect of some agri-rural policies and regulations, particularly where global standards are 
some way below EU ones (e.g. on pesticides, nitrates, genetically modified organisms and 
some aspects of food safety/supply chain controls). 
Scenario 4 considers the same trade scenario as Scenario 3, but without a reduction in 
domestic support. Again, a more de-regulatory climate could be anticipated with this approach. 
TABLE 1. Summary of future agri-rural scenarios  
Scenario 
number 
Trade outcome 
for UK-EU 
trade 
Domestic agri-
rural support 
outcome 
outcome for 
UK-other 
trade 
Regulatory 
outcome 
1 Little change for 
5-10 years 
Significant 
reduction  
No change No change 
2 Little change for 
5-10 years 
Maintained at 
current levels 
No change No change 
3 Tariffs, reducing 
trade both ways 
Significant 
reduction 
New deals, 
cheaper 
imports 
Relaxing of 
some standards 
4 Tariffs reducing 
trade both ways 
Maintained at 
current levels 
New deals, 
cheaper 
imports 
Relaxing of 
some standards 
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Estimating Scenario Impacts  
The main factors that will affect rural Wales during and after the Brexit process relate to: 
 the instability caused by uncertainty during the negotiating period and an anticipated 
transition phase, which could last from now until 2022 or so;  
 the nature and extent of changes to trading prospects for Welsh business, but especially 
agriculture vis-à-vis the rest of the EU and third countries outside the EU, which will most 
likely happen after 2019 but could continue indefinitely thereafter;  
 the extent and pace of change in respect of UK and Welsh agricultural and rural policy 
reform, which again should not begin until 2019, but where we might anticipate the basics 
of a new approach to emerge between then and 2022 (i.e. more quickly than the trading 
outcomes); and 
 the shape and scale of public sector funding for the Welsh economy, particularly in respect 
of public services in rural areas and policies for growth and investment which, as the UK 
leaves Europe, will increasingly depend upon the funding relationship between Cardiff and 
Whitehall and Welsh Government priorities, in a likely context of unstable but generally 
slow UK growth. 
Against these factors, we must consider the current state of Welsh agriculture and rural areas 
and their capacity to absorb, react and respond in the face of change. A broad examination of 
status and capacity is made in Appendix 1 to this report, covering Wales’ rural economy, 
agriculture and environment and summarising some key points relevant to future change. 
Looking ahead, we can distinguish an initial adjustment period up to perhaps 2023, and a 
longer-term period beyond that point.  Whilst it is the general aim of this report to focus upon 
policy recommendations for the post-Brexit situation and thus an implied long-term, the short-
term will nonetheless prove critical for the Welsh rural economy, environment and 
communities, as farms and other rural actors and stakeholders react to emerging trends and 
shocks.  
The direction of potential change, in respect of both trading conditions and policy support for 
agriculture and rural areas, in particular, is similar. The most likely changes in trading 
conditions would tend to disadvantage the competitive position of Welsh agriculture vis-à-vis 
its main current markets and trading competitors, and the most likely direction of change in 
respect of future levels of support to the UK farm sector (based upon policy rhetoric from 
Whitehall, at least) is downwards, as compared to the current situation. Even in respect of the 
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wider public funding climate, we may anticipate generally reduced levels of support to Wales 
than has historically been enjoyed post-devolution.  
However, within these generally ‘negative’ probable change scenarios, there are 
opportunities, both in respect of potential changes to trading patterns and options domestically 
and internationally, and in respect of the targeting and added value of domestic support to 
agriculture, forestry, the natural environment and rural development in Wales. It is therefore 
important to map out approaches that prioritise opportunities for rural development when 
planning future policy.   
Policymakers will need to consider how, and how differently across space and time, impacts 
will be caused and will interact dynamically with one another during and after the Brexit 
process.  The next sub-sections take each of the main factors set out above and discuss how 
they might be anticipated to affect Welsh agriculture and rural areas, in turn and then in 
combination – as each will act in parallel. The impacts of each of the four scenarios are then 
examined in a table. 
Uncertainty 
Up to the point when the UK is scheduled formally to leave the EU, and probably for at least 
two or three years beyond, the domestic economy will be subject to uncertainties in respect of 
the outcome of the detailed negotiating process for departure and post-departure ‘transition 
arrangements’. Already, some of this uncertainty has affected the economy, with devaluations 
of the pound against the other major currencies including the Euro, following the initial 
referendum result and then again following the recent UK general election. When the currency 
devalues it makes imports more expensive, and exports better value.  At the same time, the 
city responds swiftly to every key step in the clarification process, judging whether and to what 
extent these steps represent a boost, or a problem, for UK companies and the health of the 
economy more generally. In turn, this affects real economic performance, inflation, and 
business expectations and decisions, which then affects public exchequer incomes from 
taxation and returns on investments. Thus the more uncertain the process, the more we might 
anticipate sudden swings in any or all of these elements. For rural Wales and Welsh farming, 
the key variables likely to be affected by this process are prices for (inputs and) outputs, 
general costs of living and variations in public spending – reflecting the heavy dependence of 
rural areas upon the public sector and upon agriculture, in particular. 
The impact of big swings in output prices for the main farm sectors in Wales – sheep, beef 
and dairy – could be to make farmers less able or willing to invest in long-term development 
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of their businesses because of the difficulty of predicting future cash flow and income. 
However, messages from the media and sector bodies might seek to counteract this. Also, in 
the short-term at least, UK currency devaluation should give an immediate boost to sheep 
producers and grazing livestock as a whole, via the twin effect of higher export demand firming 
up prices, and the value of the Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) increasing because it is fixed in 
Euros, which becomes worth more pounds.  
Dairy producers, being less dependent on subsidy and on export markets, won’t feel these 
benefits so much but, because the UK dairy market is under-supplied and imports become 
less attractive with currency devaluation, they should see some positive impacts in milk prices, 
although the price of concentrates – many composed of imported proteins – will also rise, in 
parallel.  
Generally, therefore, the more extensive farm systems in Wales with low input reliance should 
see some short-term financial gains. While these sectors may see reduced investment, dairy, 
also horticulture and other more niche sectors could identify opportunities for growth based 
upon food sector incentives to source more products and/or raw materials domestically. 
To set against this, we need to consider the wider economic effect of turbulence and 
uncertainty.  As a generally import-dependent food economy, the UK should anticipate rising 
inflation as a result of currency falls. This will increase rural households’ costs of living and 
devalue any savings. The short-term visible effect could look like growth, but as it is fuelled by 
consumer spending it won’t represent real growth in a material sense (we have already seen 
some of this over the past year). Business investment decisions are more key to underlying 
trends in the economy and these might become either more positive or more cautious, 
depending upon other factors such as share prices and the cost of borrowing, itself affected 
by whether and to what extent the bank of England seeks to curb inflation via interest rate 
rises. If the emerging outcomes of the Brexit negotiations look like the UK Government is on 
the way to creating a stable and positive business environment, then business investment 
should benefit. If not, and the converse is true, confidence will be lower and business will seek 
to move resources out of the UK to other countries and markets. If the economy thus shrinks, 
public revenues will be reduced and government settlements with the devolved powers will be 
less generous. On the other hand if signs are more positive, spending could remain stable.  
Unless there is a change of government, any major increase in spending appears unlikely, 
although higher budgets for health and education as well as infrastructure could be a feature 
of spending round redistributions, within limits.  
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Until 2022, the UK Government has pledged to maintain current support to agriculture and 
Rural Development, including LEADER programmes. Therefore, uncertainty in the wider 
economy should not affect these important elements of support for farming, environmental 
management (i.e. Glastir) and rural economies and communities. Likewise, the EU Structural 
Fund programme for West Wales and the Valleys will be largely protected and will continue to 
spend on business growth and investment, including infrastructure, until 2022. Given the 
nature of Wales, a proportion of this funding will have a positive impact upon rural areas, even 
if the largest investments are in Wales’ main conurbations, as has been the pattern historically. 
Trading prospects 
The UK is seeking to negotiate continuing free market access to the single European market, 
as part of the Brexit deal, but without accepting all the duties and obligations which apply to 
others in that marketplace (notably free movement of workers). The EU is unlikely to grant this 
without some restrictions, not least for fear of making departure from the EU look too attractive 
to other members. So, we may anticipate a UK-EU trading agreement which places some 
restrictions on UK exports to and inputs from the EU. The UK will push hard for free access in 
those areas firstly where it has strong value exports to Europe, and as a second priority, where 
it is heavily dependent upon imports from the EU.  
Agricultural imports and exports are not a major priority in respect of economic value to the 
UK, whereas they are relatively more important to countries like France and the Netherlands. 
Thus we may see a situation where the UK is willing to trade off the imposition of tariffs in its 
minor sectors like agriculture, in return for no tariffs on things like cars and the financial sector.  
It is possible that the EU might favour imposing two-way tariffs on sheepmeat as a way to give 
a stimulus to its declining sheep sectors in France and Spain, whereas it could be less keen 
for dairy and horticulture as these are sectors where the UK consumer market remains 
significant for EU producers. To what extent UK negotiators would resist or accept these 
patterns would depend upon the signals they might receive from the UK’s largest organisations 
in food and drink: e.g. the multinational processors like Unilever, and the big five retailers, for 
whom lamb is unlikely to be an important focus of market attention.  Strong calls from the farm 
lobby to resist tariffs on sheepmeat, on the basis that this could bankrupt much of the British 
landscape, might or might not prove effective. With the added complication of how to deal with 
the special arrangements for New Zealand lamb’s access to EU markets – negotiated by the 
UK as part of our initial entry into Europe – it seems possible that tariffs on sheepmeat could 
be agreed as part of a Brexit trade deal with the EU. If there should be no trade deal within 
the 2 years up to 2019, without transition arrangements the ‘default’ exit position would 
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certainly include tariffs on all main agricultural commodities. The scale of tariffs under a 
negotiated deal could be anything from 5% to perhaps 40% while under default conditions 
they would be around the higher end of this scale: a 12.8% tariff plus a variable amount per 
tonne depending on the cut, which can amount to as much as 50% ad-valorem equivalent 
(AHDB, 2016).  
If there is no deal by 2019 but agreement on both sides that a deal is possible and desirable 
by e.g. 2022, we can anticipate transition arrangements keeping the UK notionally in a free-
trading relationship with the EU, probably for a fee, up to then. This implies few impacts for 
Welsh agriculture and rural areas, for the next five years, although if a transition arrangement 
proved costly to public finances there could be negative impacts upon public spending in rural 
Wales.  
Any situation with tariffs on sheepmeat would mean much higher costs of access to the current 
main market for producers of lamb, which is Wales’ largest agricultural export by volume and 
value. If prices to EU consumers rose by anything from 5% to 40%, reduced demand could 
(significantly) depress UK lamb prices and render a significant number of farm businesses in 
Wales even less financially viable and unable to cover their costs of production from 
agricultural income. Even with continuing subsidy, this could render it uneconomic to continue 
producing sheep for a much larger share of existing producers and for a sustained period of 
years, rather than the smaller proportion and sporadic occurrence that we already see in the 
sector.  It would send a clear message to older farmers that they might do best to cut their 
losses and retire now, and to those younger farmers with borrowings based upon future 
income projections, it could send them into bankruptcy.  
Thus there would be a shake-out, and those farms with the most efficient and least borrowed 
sheep systems might well buy up more land and spread their operations and fixed costs over 
a much larger area.  Highly extensive ‘ranching’ might survive, therefore, while elsewhere, 
other kinds of buyer could be expected to pick up the land released from former sheep farms 
– forestry companies, energy enterprises and tourism and leisure sector users, even 
environmental NGOs. 
In any situation where some level of standard tariff were applied to all agricultural products 
traded between the UK and EU (e.g. a default to World Trade Organisation Most-Favoured 
Nation status, in the absence of a bespoke trade deal), then the impacts for Welsh sheep 
producers would be similar to those just described, but there would be additional impacts on 
other products and sectors. Notably, the UK food sector as a whole would have increased 
incentive to encourage an expansion of (efficient) domestic supplies for fruit and vegetables, 
dairy products, high value products like wine and beer and, to a lesser extent, beef and 
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livestock feeds. This could lead to new opportunities to expand production in these sectors, 
which in rural Wales would suggest more horticulture especially in the south and north-
east/border areas where there is already a culture and infrastructure for these products, and 
more dairying in the lowland areas of the north, south and west of Wales. Vineyards, barley 
and hops could become a more visible feature of south Wales farming, and the beer and spirits 
sectors could expand generally into many areas of rural Wales, given the ease with which 
micro-breweries and distilleries can now be cost-effectively set up and run.  
These kinds of development of course assume that the agriculture sector is able and willing 
to respond quickly to new market opportunities and to work closely with others in supply chains 
to ensure that it can produce what they are looking for, to the right quality and price 
specifications. 
Policy reform 
The UK Treasury and successive UK Ministers have stated publicly that they do not support 
the principle of paying farmers indefinite income support without a direct connection to the 
delivery of public goods that markets will not provide. This refers to the biggest current form 
of direct financial support to UK agriculture from the CAP: Pillar 1 aid, or the current Basic 
Payment Scheme. This view has been held by successive UK governments, irrespective of 
the party leadership (Labour or Conservative), for a sustained period of at least 20 years. 
During the referendum campaign, a rare consensus emerged that the basic rationale for 
support, if not its scale, must change. 
There will be an Agriculture Bill in the next two years’ legislative programme, as announced in 
the Queen’s Speech in June 2017. It is widely anticipated that this will seek to produce a new 
set of objectives for future support to the sector, which will more clearly focus upon its role in 
providing public benefits, public goods and/or ecosystem services, for which some level of 
public funding is justified in the eyes of UK Treasury and, by inference, the UK taxpayer (e.g.  
Gove, 20172). This implies a future approach to ‘subsidy’ that is more single purpose than 
previously. It may still include the longstanding distinction between payments on a regular and 
repeated basis (annual payments, usually linked to land), and ‘investment’-style aids which 
help support restructuring through performance-enhancing equipment, skills and training, 
planning and strategic development.  
                                               
2 In his first major speech as environment secretary, Michael Gove said ‘there is a growing appetite for a new 
system of agricultural support which respects their work and puts environmental protection and enhancement 
first.’ 21 July 2017. 
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The biggest uncertainty in respect of UK policies for agriculture and rural development, both 
during and after the Brexit process and any transition period, remains the financial scale and 
reach of these policies. For Welsh agriculture, this is a critical point. Beef and sheep sectors 
in Wales are heavily financially dependent upon support from the Basic Payment Scheme 
(BPS), and to a lesser extent from the Glastir scheme. This dependence is sustained through 
an EU-level framework which largely determines the scale of the BPS, at least. At farm level, 
BPS varies by area of land farmed and currently to a minor extent by its productive capacity. 
Other sectors (dairy, arable, horticulture, pigs and poultry) receive a lower share of average 
income from CAP payments. 
As previously mentioned, Wales is now moving its Pillar 1 support from what was a historically- 
based payment until 2014 (i.e. offering a higher rate of funding/ha to more productive land and 
sectors) to a flat-rate area payment, which will be fully in place by 2019. On top of the standard 
payment per hectare an additional transition payment, whose scale decreases annually and 
which is only paid on the first 50 hectares of each farm, is added to this between 2015 and 
2019 to cushion the redistributive effect of the change. The shift moves money from productive 
land and sectors (dairy and crops) to less productive ones (LFA sheep and beef). Wales also 
restricts eligibility for payments to a minimum area of five hectares and a maximum amount of 
€300,000 for all claims. Under EU rules, young farmers (principal farmers under 40 years of 
age) receive a higher rate of payment for their first five years of claims. 
The current trend in Pillar 1 support in Wales, therefore, compounded by the post-Brexit 
devaluation of sterling, is to give quite a bit more support to farms on poorer land in the 
harshest parts of the country. So, extensive upland and hill beef and sheep farms across 
Wales are currently enjoying higher CAP aid levels than they have seen for quite some time. 
By contrast, dairy and cropping farms and those with more intensive livestock (e.g. beef 
finishing, poultry and pigs) either receive no aid or will receive successively less each year, 
between now and 2019. It is unclear at present, whether UK Ministers’ assurances concerning 
the maintenance of ‘existing levels of support’ to the sector refer to the situation as it was 
immediately after the referendum, or whether it will also include the significant changes that 
have occurred and will continue to occur to budgets and payments between now and March 
2019. 
Vocal (and potentially influential) commentators (e.g. Helm, 2016) have suggested that after 
the UK leaves the EU, Pillar 1 aid should be cut successively over perhaps five years so that 
it is completely abolished by 2025. At the same time, it is suggested that agri-environmental 
schemes could be expanded and/or simplified, enabling many farmers to apply to receive 
continuing support via this route. This would establish a principle that future support is only 
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paid in return for the delivery of public goods and/or ecosystem services. However, among the 
groups discussing these options, some clearly see this as a means to reduce the overall scale 
of support to agriculture in future.  Others appear to see it rather as a way of re-legitimising a 
basic principle that all farming can deliver benefits to the public that go beyond food production 
and merit public support. In this second case, the assumption is that overall farm spending 
might not alter much from the present. 
A growing collaboration of environmental and farming interests focused on the hills and 
uplands is promoting what might represent an intermediate view (Upland Alliance, 2016). This 
coalition argues that, irrespective of future support in the rest of the country, the uplands 
deserve a special deal because of the underlying economic marginality and high 
environmental quality, as well as value for water cycling and carbon storage, of these areas. 
They suggest a tiered system of future upland support, with a basic level paid to all farmed 
land, probably on a per-hectare basis; supplemented by potentially locally-designed and 
delivered, targeted and more tailored payments seeking and rewarding higher levels of 
environmental benefit and/or social added-value, and negotiated on a farm by farm, or 
landscape-by-landscape, basis. More detailed proposals are being developed in some areas 
(e.g. Exmoor, EHFN, 2016), and the same basic model was strongly supported at a Welsh 
uplands futures meeting in March 2017 (Ricketts-Hein et al., 2017). 
It seems likely that at UK level, the Treasury will favour a net reduction in the CAP-equivalent 
support budget to the UK agriculture sector and that it will then be for Ministers, in Westminster 
and from the devolved governments, to decide how a smaller overall ‘cake’ should be divided. 
The implication of adopting an upland-friendly model would be that England loses much more 
than Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, which could be politically sensitive for English 
politicians. A more ‘balanced’ shrinkage of the pot for each nation would mean significant cuts 
and subsequent challenges for beef and sheep farming in Wales. 
It thus seems prudent, in this report, to use our scenarios to envisage perhaps the two 
extremes of possible future public support to farming. Currently Pillar 2 agri-environment 
schemes in Wales represent around one-quarter of the total CAP support. So, at one extreme, 
all Pillar 1 funding could be removed and not replaced, cutting the farm support budget to a 
quarter of its current scale, and at the other extreme, all the current Pillar 1 funding could be 
shifted into a four-times larger and simplified, more accessible type of Glastir, over perhaps 
the next 5 years. The first extreme could lead to significant business collapse in beef and 
sheep farming, similar to that outlined already in respect of sheep tariff impositions (see the 
‘trade implications’ sub-section), while the second would mean more modest shifts, 
encouraging more tangible environmental performance and land management benefits from 
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the majority of Welsh farms. Indirectly, any overall cut in support can be anticipated to reduce 
land values – this will take time to work its way through the system but could then potentially 
reduce barriers to new entrants and put heavily borrowed farms in financial difficulties. 
Funding to the wider Welsh economy 
It is perhaps most difficult to predict causal linkages between Brexit and impacts upon Welsh 
rural areas, because these linkages are multiple and largely indirect. Here we focus on the 
significance of public sector spending, tourism, SMEs and service provision for the rural 
economy in Wales. 
If the UK economy does well during and after Brexit, the UK Government would be able to 
provide new investment in infrastructure, services and key priorities like social housing, health 
and education. On the basis of need, all of Wales (and by implication, its rural areas) might at 
least maintain current levels of service provision and thus contribute to the vitality and quality 
of life in rural communities. To date, UK Ministers have seemed positive about the outcomes 
of funding programmes under the CAP’s second Pillar, including those for rural skills and 
training, business development, productivity and economic diversification, as well as for rural 
social and cultural protection and enhancement (as in LEADER and other similar local 
initiatives). In the overall funding picture, these are relatively small spending items and thus 
we might anticipate no immediate pressure to cut them, beyond Brexit. 
Nevertheless, it could be premature to expect no change to broader rural public service 
provision in Wales as a result of leaving the EU. Should the process trigger harsher economic 
conditions and lower growth in the UK as a whole (i.e. lower tax receipts), there would most 
likely need to be reductions in public spending. Hence for all our four scenarios, whilst the 
implicit assumption is for these kinds of support to be maintained in future, it is important to 
bear in mind that significant cuts could be required if the impact of the process on the UK 
economy were ultimately negative. 
Also, the quality and impact of rural service provision is affected by both supply and demand. 
The points above have focused upon the supply side, but demand side changes could be 
significant.  Most obviously, if changes to the farm sector trigger widespread business and 
family hardship in rural areas, the demand for a range of public services could increase 
significantly. If budgets for the medium term are not prepared for such an increase, the 
inevitable result will be reduced levels of relative provision and thus greater social and 
community problems and challenges. If combined with public spending cuts, these impacts 
would be magnified. 
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Considering impacts of the four scenarios 
The table which follows presents a summary of likely impacts upon Welsh agriculture, the rural 
environment and economy of the four possible Brexit scenarios described earlier. It pulls 
together the combination of likely impacts from uncertainty, trade, domestic support and the 
wider economic and regulatory context and sketches how these might differentially affect 
farming and rural areas across the country.    
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TABLE 2 – Summary of scenario impacts on Welsh agriculture and rural areas 
 
 
Farming sector 
impacts 
Rural economy & 
community outcomes 
Rural environment 
outcomes 
Food chain outcomes Key determinants of 
local adaptation 
Regional patterns 
Scenario 1 
– free 
trade with 
EU, then 
with 
others, 
support 
cut by 
60% 
Most beef and 
sheep farms 
become 
economically 
inviable, 
dairy/other 
sectors OK 
(especially as 
milk prices 
now rising).  
EU imports will 
still out-
compete 
domestic 
produce for 
the bulk UK 
horticulture 
market.   
Widespread livestock 
farm insolvency 
triggers restructuring, 
so fewer people 
managing larger areas. 
Health and social needs 
for farms in crisis, 
downturn in agri-
economy, decline in 
rural family/working 
populations. Possible 
loss of large-scale 
abattoir in N Wales. 
Rural community – 
fewer trades, fewer job 
opportunities, decline 
in young families in 
short-term. In south 
and east Wales dairy, 
pigs/ poultry and 
horticulture more 
stable, fewer impacts. 
Expansion in forestry 
and leisure offers 
medium-term scope 
for job creation in 
services/ leisure but 
risks to tourism from 
neglected land. 
Upland and lowland 
peatland/meadows 
and associated 
features are under-
managed; scrub 
spreads, land moves 
out of farming into 
other uses including 
leisure, forestry, 
energy generation – 
biomass, solar, wind. 
Some land is 
abandoned in the 
most inaccessible 
areas, whilst in more 
productive zones, 
dairying may expand.  
Reduced grazing stock 
may mean marginally 
better water quality in 
uplands and sensitive 
pastoral lowland areas 
(e.g. Wye valley), 
reduced GHG from 
agriculture, reduced 
public access, negative 
historic feature and 
landscape quality 
impacts. 
Retailers/processors 
switch away from UK 
produce to imports for 
beef and lamb, except 
in respect of higher-
value niche products 
where the supply chain 
linkages, price 
premiums and loyalties 
remain strong, 
sustaining primary 
production.  
Dairy sector linkages 
remain as now. 
Banks’ attitudes to 
indebtedness and 
poor business 
prospects for farms; 
support for 
diversification of 
incomes and 
outputs; consumer 
loyalty for Welsh 
produce; growth in 
processing capacity 
among SMEs in 
Wales to assist farms 
to add value to 
primary outputs.  
Central and north 
Wales will be 
more negatively 
affected than 
south. Critical 
risks for High 
Nature Value 
areas in the 
uplands and 
pastoral lowlands 
from under-
management in 
many situations, 
but potential 
intensification via 
transfer into 
dairying, for some 
lowland pasture. 
Likely movement 
of upland into 
other uses 
including forestry, 
where there is 
pre-existing 
infrastructure 
(e.g. near existing 
forest areas) in 
north, mid and 
west Wales. 
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TABLE 2 – Summary of scenario impacts on Welsh agriculture and rural areas 
 
 
Farming sector 
impacts 
Rural economy & 
community outcomes 
Rural environment 
outcomes 
Food chain outcomes Key determinants of 
local adaptation 
Regional patterns 
Scenario 2 
free 
EU/UK 
trade, 
same 
support 
level as 
now 
Depends upon 
types of aid – 
if they 
represent a 
status quo, 
continued 
slow farm 
enlargement in 
hills, some 
dairying 
growth in S&W 
Wales, and 
continued 
growth in 
diversification 
and non-farm 
work among 
farm families. 
Continued slow growth 
in jobs and incomes, 
helped by continuing 
rural development aids 
to farms, SMEs and 
micro-business start-
ups. Possible boost to 
tourism if Sterling 
remains low in value 
vis-à-vis EU and wider 
market currencies. 
Assume continuing 
spread of Glastir 
across rural Wales 
with increasing 
benefits, but 
challenges to sustain 
adequate sensitive 
management and 
restoration work in 
most marginal areas as 
farms continue to feel 
the impacts of cost-
price squeezes, 
farmer’s age and 
succession remains a 
challenge. 
 
Little change from the 
present situation, 
although the 
implementation of the 
new Wales Food 
Strategy, if it happens, 
within the next 5 years 
could help to stimulate 
gradual, positive 
developments in 
added value and 
employment in rural 
Wales. 
Short-term 
uncertainty may 
discourage 
investment and 
entrepreneurship, so 
suggesting more 
financial vulnerability 
for those farms not 
already well- 
integrated into 
supply chains. 
However once the 
policy direction is 
clearer, the recent 
modest but positive 
development of 
these twin elements 
should be reinstated. 
No significant 
change from 
current patterns 
and trends. 
Scenario 3 
– tariffs 
on EU/UK 
agri-
products, 
then freer 
trade with 
others. 
Domestic 
support 
Most beef and 
sheep farms 
inviable, as 
markets for 
sheepmeat 
collapse. Shift 
in profit away 
from grazing 
livestock to 
horticulture, 
novel, niche or 
Big shift in rural 
economy, new land 
uses replace farming: 
leisure, tourism, 
forestry, and energy – 
also land abandonment 
and village decline in 
remote areas. More 
market opportunities 
for niche/ high value 
products near main 
More dramatic impact 
than scenario 1, same 
types of change and 
sustained over a 
potentially longer 
period, as new trading 
relations are 
established. 
Retailers look for new 
sources of meat supply 
outside EU, also for 
more domestic or non-
EU suppliers of key EU 
imports like 
horticulture, dairy, 
wine and beer. 
Possible exit of major 
processors targeting a 
wider EU market. 
Need to upskill a 
new generation of 
(fewer) more 
entrepreneurial 
farmers in how to 
produce a more 
diverse offer and 
how to manage 
business collapse, 
reorientation and 
resurrection. As in 
Again, worse 
impacts on farms 
in north and 
centre than in 
south, with some 
increased 
pressure on land, 
especially in the 
south, north-east 
and borders, for a 
variety of new 
 
  
20 
TABLE 2 – Summary of scenario impacts on Welsh agriculture and rural areas 
 
 
Farming sector 
impacts 
Rural economy & 
community outcomes 
Rural environment 
outcomes 
Food chain outcomes Key determinants of 
local adaptation 
Regional patterns 
cut by 
60% 
high-value 
products 
(wine)  
processing centres  
leading to population 
growth 
scenario 1, support 
services for farm 
families will be vital. 
products and 
uses. More 
forestry/ tourism 
in mid and north-
west Wales.  
Scenario 4 
– tariffs, 
same 
support 
level 
Market for UK 
sheepmeat 
exports 
collapses, but 
continuing 
subsidy 
ensures more 
farms survive 
than in 
Scenarios 1 & 
3, potentially 
to re-
orientate. 
More welsh 
beef is 
consumed in 
the UK. More 
opportunities 
in horticulture, 
dairy, etc. 
This is a scenario with 
some features of 3, but 
with the big change in 
market signals 
cushioned by 
continuing farm and 
rural development 
support. The hardest 
hit farm sector is 
sheep, so all areas with 
specialist sheep farms 
would see the greatest 
changes while beef 
output may stabilise 
and other sectors can 
be expected to grow. 
Difficult to determine 
short-term, as farmers 
may retain some 
sheep and expand 
beef on marginal 
upland farms, which 
could bring benefits. 
Growth in other 
sectors and uses will 
have mixed impacts – 
potential benefits if 
carefully managed and 
sited. Long-term, there 
could be land 
management decline 
on the most exposed 
areas if sheep 
numbers fall below the 
levels needed to 
maintain biodiverse 
vegetation. 
In the short-term, 
processors and 
retailers will see more 
incentive to source 
domestically, but may 
seek longer-term gains 
from freer global trade. 
Replacing Irish imports 
will be a key challenge 
for the beef and dairy 
sectors, and could 
incentivise more 
vertical integration in 
these sectors, at UK 
level. 
UK/ Welsh Food 
chain reactions and 
strategies will 
become critical to 
the full range of 
outcomes. 
Assistance to help 
mainly sheep 
enterprises re-orient 
successfully towards 
more multifunctional 
businesses 
(combining farm and 
non-farm incomes, 
as well as 
considering other 
farm outputs), could 
also be vital. 
The highest land 
and communities 
in Wales in the 
north and central 
belt could see 
super-
extensification 
and widespread 
agri-rural decline 
(see p.13). 
Elsewhere, 
change less 
dramatic, growth 
in lowland 
dairying and 
(e.g.intensive) 
beef with very 
mixed impacts 
depending upon 
the production 
systems favoured 
by the food chain. 
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Summary Impact and Comparison Across Scenarios  
The patterns in Table 2 show a range of similarities, regardless of which of the scenarios is 
considered. These include: 
 a likely decline in sheep production beyond the current and likely short-term ‘heyday’ 
period, and a need to restructure and/or re-orientate the basis of the business for many of 
those operating this major farm business type in Wales (i.e. specialist sheep production, or 
mainly sheep with some beef suckler cows/beef finishing in sheds); 
 a differentiated spatial pattern of economic and environmental impact whereby the north 
and west of Wales is likely to suffer stronger negative impacts whilst in the south and east, 
more potentially positive economic/diverse environmental impacts may be anticipated; 
 the key role and influence of the food chain, in respect of how it chooses to respond to the 
Brexit process and likely outcomes, centred around key processor and retailer perspectives 
including buyer loyalty and willingness to invest in Wales, Welsh product image, as well as 
longer-term pricing and market growth strategies. The dynamic nature of this sector is also 
important – it cannot be assumed that the current pattern of operation will remain as it is 
when the wider economic situation could change quite rapidly, and larger operators in the 
sector will need to be anticipating and responding quickly to change; and 
 an appreciation that, whilst hardly visible in basic statistics, agriculture remains a major 
driver of economic and community viability in the many remote areas of Wales, and the 
main manager of its habitats, biodiversity and landscapes. Thus, for all scenarios in which 
the economic fortunes of the dominant type of agriculture (grazing livestock for meat 
production) seem set to decline, consideration must be given to how best to encourage, 
stimulate and support alternative business and land management options that can develop 
sustainably, to support wider Welsh Government goals. This is not to say that grazing 
livestock farming will disappear from the Welsh countryside, but one can anticipate a 
potentially significant decline in its relative importance to Welsh rural economic activity, 
competitiveness and community viability. This leads to questions of how it can be either 
replaced, and/or retained by adding value or broadening market reach and the returns to 
producers. Potential negative environmental impacts of intensification in southern Wales 
could also merit some attention, as these farms respond to changing trade conditions.   
This report has not considered the impact of a Brexit immigration control policy upon the 
profitability and modus operandii of the food sector in Wales and the UK as a whole, but this 
should also be recognised as part of the mix. There is a current heavy dependence of 
 
  
22 
abattoirs, veterinary services, meat cutting and dairy processing plants, food packing etc. on 
skilled and unskilled labour from Eastern Europe. 
To summarise, it is necessary to reconsider how best to foster and sustain farming’s positive 
contribution to the quality and character of the natural environment of Wales, if the economic 
incentives for grazing livestock production decline further; whilst being ready to cope with 
potential negative pressures from growth in intensive farming and other land uses, in some 
areas.  A focus upon entrepreneurship skills and confidence, new products, new markets for 
alternative products, new enterprises and new multi-sectoral, environmentally sustainable 
land-based business models would seem worthwhile, in this context. At the same time, re-
thinking the rationale and form of future support to maintain and enhance ecosystem services 
and public benefits from land management is also clearly necessary. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
The combined implications of the scenarios discussed in this document give a clear sense of 
opportunities and needs for the short and medium term, in Welsh agriculture and rural 
development policy. These can be divided into three main areas: 
1. Preparing Welsh farm and land management sectors and businesses for a post-Brexit 
future. The WRO report on likely impact of 2013 CAP reforms on farms in Wales highlights 
‘we can witness the significance of farm family skill sets (for instance, levels of 
entrepreneurship, multi-functionality) and types of farm family strategy as being important 
factors in shaping the degree of resilience and adaptability of farms to impending 
…changes’ (WRO, 2010). Up-skilling, developing collaborative capacity and improving 
efficiency, environmental knowledge and farm-level coping strategies will all be important. 
2. Increasing agri-food sector and rural community resilience, through more active long-term 
partnership working between Welsh Government and commercial or social actors in the 
food, public services and financial sectors in Wales, planning for longer-term strength. 
3. Developing a new bespoke approach to public support to maintain and enhance natural 
resources and rural vitality benefits provided by land managers and rural communities 
across rural Wales, for the benefit of current and future generations. 
Each of these areas is suggested as major themes for planning and action: the first two 
representing an adaptation strategy, and the third constituting a framework for longer-term 
support, for land management and rural vitality. The adaptation strategy might focus on 
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building resilience in Welsh agriculture and the rural environment, in the coming 5-10 years, 
as follows. 
 
 Fostering resilience in farm and land management businesses  
- Uncertainty, coupled with potential trade and public funding changes, suggests that 
the majority of current farmers and farming families in Wales need to review their 
business performance and strategies. They should look to enhance efficiency in 
the short-term (but in ways which reduce risk to the underlying health of the 
business and the environment); and seek to minimise their vulnerability to short-
term price fluctuations and/or unfavourable lending rates. 
- For those farms without successors, near to or over retirement age, it should be a 
priority to plan for a safe exit from the business, either transferring to a younger 
and well-trained generation or selling up to a more profitable 
neighbouring/alternative business, which may or may not be agricultural.  With a 
concern for future rural vitality, transfers of farms to people with new, more diverse 
and eco-friendly business models which offer a prospect of more jobs, or a wider 
range of outputs with added value, should be encouraged. 
- For farms with hopes for succession, it will be essential for the younger generation 
to be well-skilled in confident and adaptable business management, looking to 
maximise the multiple potential benefits (economic, social and environmental) and 
commercial opportunities afforded by each individual farm, neighbouring group of 
farms, or producers all supplying the same food chain via a single route. In this 
context technical skills development, business planning, co-operation and 
collaboration for economic and environmental gain would all seem valuable 
potential elements to support through advisory and industry-led initiatives. 
Mobilising the creative and supportive skills of staff and leaders in Menter a 
Busnes, Farming Connect, the Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG) 
Cymru and the various levy bodies and boards (including those for minor products 
like wool) could be very valuable in this context.  
- These priorities should be supported using existing resources under the Wales 
RDP and other domestic policies, in the period between now and 2022. More 
Brexit-focused strategic delivery of already programmed advice, training, group 
development, business planning and investment aids for farms can be pursued if 
all main delivery bodies can come together with Welsh Government to consider 
and plan now. A new approach could be rolled out nationwide and in a way which 
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enables specific targeting to local ‘hotspots’ in respect of vulnerable sectors and 
communities, seeking to reach places and people that perhaps have not been easy 
to engage under previous initiatives.  
- In order to facilitate experimenting with new approaches to target different groups 
and situations, it may be necessary to provide some national funding (under state 
aid de minimis provisions), or to amend the RDP to enable more creative use of 
‘Article 25’3 co-operation aid, between now and the end of the Programme period. 
 
 Ongoing evaluation and increased partnership working 
- It will also be necessary and important to use this short-term period as one in which 
ongoing evaluation of these efforts, in an engaged and inclusive partnership 
between expert evaluators, farmers, rural communities, agencies, NGOs and 
policymakers, is established. This would help to clarify the shape and scale of a 
longer-term knowledge and investment in resilience programmes for Welsh 
agriculture and rural areas, beyond 2022. This would most likely need to offer 
continued enabling support and investment up to 2030, to facilitate robust adaptive 
management and development from Brexit impacts.  
- For the major players in the food chain in Wales, those involved in key processing 
(e.g. Dunbia, the Welsh creameries, Welsh farm foods) as well as the main retail 
groups should be invited to work with Welsh Government to consider how and in 
what circumstances they can help to support the achievement of Wales’ goals for 
food and farming. There could be scope through integrated supply chain initiatives, 
local marketing and product promotions and development, local procurement 
strategies, and other actions. Many valuable ideas were set out in the Wales Food 
Strategy consultation document – this report highlights the importance of taking 
them forward as a matter of urgency, in light of Brexit. 
 
For the future beyond Brexit, the Welsh Government’s current working group on the future of 
land management in Wales could be tasked with developing a successor support framework 
for Wales. In order to align with the broad UK consensus and UK Government statements, 
this should probably be based upon the principle of public payment for public benefit; and 
accessible in principle to all farms in Wales. This report makes no explicit recommendation on 
future funding, but takes as its starting point that the stakeholder consensus in Wales is for a 
                                               
3 Article 25 of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) Regulation, 2013. 
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continuation of some level of future support to the farm sector, as discussed in the previous 
section on ‘Policy Reform’ (p.13-15).  
To foster efficiency and effectiveness, a two-tier approach is suggested, distinguishing 
between those elements that are appropriate for all land managers and others that won’t be 
appropriate everywhere because they depend upon specific local contexts, needs and 
opportunities. The public’s willingness to pay for such a policy may need to be assessed prior 
to the setting of budgets – this could be measured using proxies from former market research 
on similar topics, or via new survey work. 
By way of author’s illustration, a broad approach could be conceptualised as ‘Natural 
Resource Managers Aid’ (with an appropriate Welsh name). It might consist of: 
A. A basic tier, paid non-competitively but offering a simple payment in return for a 
range of good farming/land management/ecosystem service provision practices, 
applicable generally across all land-based farm types (as a minimum), and going 
clearly beyond the legislative minimum. This could either be paid as a standard rate 
per hectare or as a lump sum per farm plus a per-hectare rate – possibly up to a 
maximum claim per beneficiary business, depending upon the balance of cost and 
benefit associated with the management standards that it would require. Previous 
experience strongly suggests that even a basic tier approach should be supported 
by advice to help farmers to fulfil their commitments and it could be valuable to link 
the receipt of aid to an ongoing duty to undertake some basic training to complement 
the elements in the tier. These might include soil condition and enhancement, water 
safety and conservation/flood mitigation options, basic biodiversity 
surveying/protection and landscape feature management. 
B. A basket or menu of options for additional area-based payments or investment 
funding, to enable more ambitious management, or investment in restoration or 
development work that benefits the long-term resilience of the enterprise and the 
environmental and social/cultural services that it provides to the public. The options 
could include both environmentally-focused measures as well as economically-
focused ones, because sometimes the economic stimulus will be a key means of 
securing the environmental benefits, and vice versa (e.g. consider the challenge of 
enhancing the biodiversity value of Welsh farm woodlands which are crying out for 
more active management). The types of management option could include many of 
those from Glastir Advanced and the Sustainable Management Scheme, as well as 
measures from the rest of the RDP schemes, and the most effective choice of 
options should be supported by farm planning and expert facilitation.  
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Element B could be designed and delivered locally via collective partnerships – akin to the 
Dutch agri-environment co-operatives model, or the pilot schemes developing now in Ireland, 
or the UK’s own Heritage Lottery Landscape Partnerships – at whatever scale is felt to be 
most valuable to the stakeholder bodies concerned. Such partnerships would have to include 
relevant actors from the farming community, landowners, environmental organisations or 
interests, and representatives of local community, rural business and culture/leisure and 
tourism interests. They could be linked to the areas for which Area Statements are being 
prepared under the Environment Bill 2016 by NRW; either singly or in locally-endorsed 
combinations that provide a better scale to match notions of local identity, and capacity to act 
and plan strategically. Local community groups and the WLGA have previously suggested 
devolved design and delivery approaches such as this, for government aids. 
Alternatively, if there is insufficient confidence among farmers and landowners that such 
partnerships would work, it would be possible to design and operate B as a national scheme 
with some local tailoring to reflect specific local agricultural, cultural, social and environmental 
priorities and needs / opportunities. The national scheme should also be a partnership 
enterprise, represented via strong collaborative steering in which all main stakeholders have 
a real and meaningful stake and to which they are expected to contribute ideas and resources 
(financial or in respect of skills, time and knowledge). Particularly in periods of uncertainty, 
evidence from across the EU demonstrates the value of collective approaches to landscape 
management and local economic development (e.g. PEGASUS, 2017). 
It would of course be possible to make A conditional upon some minimal level of engagement 
with B, or otherwise to pursue some linkage between the two components.  But in essence, 
these kinds of detail should be worked up in partnership with the range of stakeholder bodies 
who stand to benefit most from such a system – both as private operators and as public 
recipients of their outcomes in respect of the environment, rural communities, thriving rural 
economies and rural culture and heritage. 
The vision for the support framework could be designed consistent with that recently agreed 
among the ERA group: “Sustainable land use which uses our Natural Resources to benefit 
the social, environmental and cultural well-being of Wales” (Welsh Government working 
Environmental and Rural Affairs Group 2017, unpublished). Likewise, its principles could 
include those already proposed by the group: 
• the budget must be flexible and used where needed; 
• a local/area based approach; 
• business planning should be a mandatory part of receiving support; 
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• outcome-focused policies;  
• a collaborative approach should be encouraged; 
• funding available to all farms; although targeting other areas for additional funds; 
• land owners rewarded for good practice but no payment for doing the bare minimum; 
• future schemes should be simple to administer and for the landowner to understand;  
and 
• payments based on standards that can be monitored and progress measured. 
More detailed aspects of operation should draw upon the best and most up-to-date experience 
of support systems and approaches nationally and internationally, as well as being informed 
by local concerns and aspirations, and the issues discussed in this report. 
These two major themes for planning and action - an adaptation strategy and a framework for 
longer term support for land management - are suggested as key priorities for action, in the 
months between now and March 2019 (the deadline for the UK to exit the European Union) 
and throughout any subsequent transition period. 
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Appendix 1: State of Welsh Rural Areas, Agriculture and the 
Rural Environment 
Current policy has a significant direct effect on Welsh agriculture and rural land use – via 
current CAP support, environmental regulations and broader contextual policies shaping 
farming and other rural land-based activities in Wales. These have knock-on impacts for the 
broader aspects of rural development – rural economies, rural social and cultural fabric, and 
the Welsh rural environment’s character and quality, including the health and functionality of 
its ecosystems. 
The statements in this section are based on analysis of a range of statistical and secondary 
research data.  
What is Rural Wales? In this report a broad definition is used, in line with the Wales Rural 
Development Programme (WG, 2015). 
 ‘Predominantly rural’ (OECD definition) local authority areas cover 82.1% of Wales, and 
contain around 960,000 (33%) of the Welsh population. However, rural land is found in all 
of Wales’ local authority areas, including those of its largest settlements on the south and 
north coasts.  
 Most of Mid and West Wales is sparsely populated ‘with challenges for landscape, 
connectivity, business structure and employment, where agriculture provides an important 
but declining contribution’ (WG, 2014),  
 The mixed urban-rural, former industrial South Wales Valleys host its most economically-
deprived communities, also dramatic rural landscapes and a strong sense of culture.  
Population and economy 
Economically, rural Wales has strong and weak points. Key sectors include the public 
sector and tourism, as well as small and medium-sized manufacturing and crafts.  
 A study (LUC, 2002) of six contrasting market towns in north and south Wales found all 
were dominated by employment in public administration and services, involving between 
44% (near urban) and 93% (remote rural) employees. However, the service function of 
market towns had decreased with increased centralisation of retail and administrative 
functions. Schools were key, as employers and in forging links between future employees 
and local businesses. Livestock markets provided a vital service function for surrounding 
agricultural communities. In near-urban areas there were few remaining farm businesses 
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but in remote rural market towns over 60% of VAT-registered businesses were associated 
with agriculture. Near-urban market towns were characterised by a few major employers 
(in manufacturing, construction, distribution and public administration) employing over 100 
people, while more remote rural areas were characterised by SMEs and micro-businesses. 
A range of current sources (see below) suggest the picture has not changed markedly in 
the past 15 years. Total employment in Wales’ 9 rural counties was 339,700 (WG, 2009). 
 The IWA report on the Welsh economy (IWA, 2015) noted that since devolution in 1999, 
Wales’ economic performance has been stable, leaving it with a GDP/capita figure which 
is just over 70% of the UK average. It suggests the Welsh economy is more vulnerable to 
global trends than the UK as a whole, because of the significance of oil to the principality. 
 Rural Wales has a relatively high economic activity rate and low level of unemployment 
(WRO, 2009). During the recession, small businesses in rural areas reported problems 
with cashflow, indebtedness and repossessions. Agriculture and tourism sectors fared 
better than others, but rural services suffered significantly from public sector austerity 
(WRO, op. cit.).  
 The Welsh Rural Business Survey (WRO, 2013a) highlights the apparent persistence of a 
low-skills, low-wage economy over the past 15 years. The IWA report (2015) concluded 
that ‘Wales has a problem about a missing Mittelstand [middle layer] and absent Welsh 
brands because it has too few solid middle-sized firms’. Policy and markets encourage 
successful SMEs to sell out to non-Welsh larger companies, taking management and 
profits out of Wales even if the workforce remains. They called for major public investment 
in new housing, domestic energy efficiency and infrastructure, plus work to strengthen 
Welsh supply chain linkages, buyer loyalty and the incentive to invest / ability to retain 
added-value, among SMEs. 
 Eluned Morgan AM’s 2017 report for CLA Cymru said: ‘There is a need to develop a new 
partnership between rural and urban Wales which recognises that they can benefit each 
other and a need to develop an appreciation that inter-regional connections are critical 
rather than just planning for urban and rural regions in isolation’. 
Tourism, both coastal and inland, is an important sector and ‘an integral part of the 
rural economy’ (WG, 2015). 
 The value of wildlife and outdoor activity tourism to Wales is estimated to be around £6.2 
billion, supporting 206,000 jobs, more than three times as many as work in agricultural 
production in Wales. The three Welsh National Parks attract 12 million visitors/year, 
spending £1 billion on goods and services (NRW, 2016). 
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  A 2012 study, ‘Valuing Wales’ seas and coasts’, estimated that coastal and marine 
environment contributed £6.8 billion to the economy of Wales, supporting more than 
92,000 jobs’. Expenditure in Wales by anglers was estimated at £74 million, supporting 
almost 1,500 Welsh jobs and £32 million in household income (cited in NRW, 2016). 
  Quality of life measures vary considerably by location and individual circumstances 
 A 2013 survey (KAS, 2013) concluded that relatively speaking, rural Wales suffered less 
from many classic measures of poverty than urban Wales. Research on rural households 
(WRO, 2013c) suggests rural social cohesion is positive, but poverty affects many, 
(especially pensioner) households. Low income households were more likely to 
experience difficulties accessing key services, and those living in a village or open 
countryside setting were more affected than those in larger settlements. 
 Household income is strong in regions close to the English border – Monmouth, Powys 
and Wrexham, possibly reflecting the impact of commuting upon standards of living in 
these areas. However, growth rates in recent years have been greater in areas of Wales 
which are further from the English border (Cardiff and Bridgend excepted – IWA, 2015). 
Commuting out of rural to urban areas for work is common in the east and Valleys (c.20% 
of working population) but not in more remote areas of West Wales (WG, 2014).  
Figure A1 Employment by sector in the 9 Rural Counties of Wales, 2009 (WG stats online) 
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Figure A2. GVA in rural Wales 
 
*rural areas at NUTS3 level include Gwynedd, Conwy and Denbighshire, Powys and South-West Wales 
Source: Statistics Wales 
Agriculture, food and forestry in Wales 
Agriculture - varied but often marginal, family-based, with incomes heavily dependent 
on public funding and / or non-farming contributions 
Wales is characterised by upland terrain with a relatively wet climate. Its agriculture is 
dominated by grazing livestock, predominantly sheep, on ‘Less Favoured Area’ land in 
comparatively small-scale farm businesses, making modest incomes (Armstrong, 2016).  
 In 2015, 88% of the land area in Wales was agricultural. Farmland area has grown in the 
past 15 years. Average farm (holding) size is steady at around 50 hectares, but this masks 
a split between numerous very small holdings and fewer commercial farms, which are 
commonly 100ha or more in size.  
 More than half of agricultural land use in Wales is permanent grass and grazing, and the 
dominant farm type is hill and upland cattle and sheep. The most common systems are 
wholly or mainly sheep with some beef suckler cows, and relatively few specialist beef 
producers. Sheep production is the main farm activity in Wales, but very small farms tend 
to have more diverse farm and non-farm outputs. The number of livestock has been quite 
stable in Wales in the past 10 years, with steady numbers of sheep and dairy cows, but 
modest declines in beef and pigs. Only 13% of the land is arable, much of this grows barley 
and wheat for own-use livestock feed, while horticulture represents a very small area. 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
ag, forestry & fishing
production
construction
wholesale, retail, transport, hotels and food
communications
finance and insurance
real estate
professional, scientific, admin
public admin & defence
other services
GVA by sector, Welsh rural areas at NUTS3 level*, 2015
GVA £m
 
  
36 
These basic figures mask significant regional and sectoral diversity 
 The largest agricultural regions - Powys and 
north-west Wales - are characterised by 
extensive sheep and beef production, with a 
high proportion of grassland classified as 
‘Severely Disadvantaged Area’ (SDA). South 
Wales has the highest crop area and second 
highest poultry numbers after the north-east. 
The south-west of Wales 
(Pembrokeshire, 
Carmarthenshire) is a 
mainly dairy region, 
seeing decline in farmed 
area as land moves into 
non-farm use, in recent 
years, while the dairy holdings that remain 
have grown in size.  
 
 Agriculture accounts for a relatively high share of total workforce in Wales by comparison 
with the UK, at just over 4%, but this has declined by c.2,000 between 2008 and 2015. In 
2015 approximately 58,000 people were working on farms in Wales (WG, 2017). Most 
principal farmers are over 55, average age has increased 2007-2013 (58 to 60), in line 
with EU-wide trends. 
In economic terms: 
 95% of the output value of Welsh farming is livestock, crops only 5%. Production is 
concentrated on larger farms: about half the farms produce 5% of output (RDP, 2014). The 
GVA of Agriculture in Wales was £406 million in 2015, and £355 million in 2016 (Statistics 
Wales). 
 There is notable variation in average farm business income (FBI) per farm: in 2015-16, the 
figure for Dairy was £32,800, for lowland beef and sheep it was £16,300 and for Less-
Favoured Area Cattle & Sheep £21,900 per farm (Statistics for Wales, 2016).  
 Change in incomes between years is also highly variable across contrasting farm types - 
incomes in milk production are very dependent upon milk prices; while beef and sheep 
farms’ incomes are much more dependent upon subsidies (pillar 1 and pillar 2). 
Figure A3. Farm types by holding area, 2015 
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 The Welsh agriculture sector is relatively important to UK farming – Welsh lamb accounts 
for 29% of the UK flock; beef, 11% of the UK herd and dairy, 12% of UK production and 
13% of the herd.  
Farm Business Survey (FBS) data for Wales shows the largest component of farm 
income for all farm types is income from the basic/single farm payment (Pillar 1 of CAP).  
 Of the main types analysed in the FBS (2016), only average dairy agriculture income has 
a significant positive value without subsidy. The agricultural income is negative on LFA 
cattle and sheep farms, which is counterbalanced with higher agri-environment payments. 
In 2015-2016, 56% of farm businesses either made a loss or would have done so without 
subsidies. Subsidies were a minor share of income on only 7% of farms in Wales.  
 Half of Welsh farms had a business farm output lower than £100k in 2015-2016, including 
23% less than £50k. Just 1% of farms had a farm business output of £800k or more, 
contributing 8% of total farm business output in Wales, by value. It should also be noted 
that the FBS figures show averages – in all sectors, some farms perform much better than 
others.  
 Also, many farm households have other income sources. FBS data suggests in 2013-14, 
around 3,000 or 12% of ‘active’ holdings in Wales (likely a much higher proportion of 
commercial farms) had some form of diversification but for two-thirds of these, 
diversification income contributed less than 25% of total income, an average of £5,000 per 
farm. Larger farm businesses tended to have the largest diversified enterprises, and 
diversification was growing on sheep and beef farms but declining in the dairy sector.  
 The FBS definition of diversification only covers enterprises operated as part of the farm, 
not incomes earned by household members from non-farm work, which may also be 
significant. The 2013 farm household income survey (WRO, 2013c) found that half had 
diversified incomes and 41% had non-farm incomes.  
 Another study (WRO, 2010) suggested that if future policy changes result in reduced 
payments to farmers, 28% would carry on business as usual; 22% would not know what 
to do; 10% would sell up and leave farming; and the remaining 40% would pursue 
strategies of diversification, making savings, joining agri-environmental schemes, starting 
alternative enterprises, or retiring. They estimated that 75% of Welsh farms were 
vulnerable to continuing cost-price squeezes over the following 5 years, and identified 3 
clusters of farmers: ‘strugglers’, policy-dependent farms, and pro-active diversified 
businesses. Small LFA sheep farms, operated by older couples, were most vulnerable 
while larger, more diverse and more entrepreneurial farms managed by younger people 
were more pro-active and resilient. 
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 The WRO report on the impact of the recession on rural Wales (WRO, 2009) identified 
evidence of significant social, welfare and health problems among farmers and their 
families, particularly in Carmarthenshire, Powys and Gwynedd. 
 A WRO report on knowledge transfer needs in Wales concluded ‘rural and land based 
sectors currently lag behind other areas of industry’ in professional status and career 
development. 
 A recent evaluation of the young entrants scheme (see below – Thomas, 2014) found few 
applicants were completely new to farming, but most were starting their own business.  
The main barriers identified for new entrants were: increased size of farm holdings; the 
price of land; the capital costs of set up and low profitability; the negative image of 
agriculture as a career choice and the reluctance of some older farmers to retire. 
 Three years ago, land prices in Wales were reported as the highest in the UK (RICS/RAU, 
2014), due to a combination of strong demand from farmers expanding production on 
neighbouring plots, and a revival of ‘lifestyle’ demand as the post-recession housing 
market recovered. High values are a factor leading some commentators to call for the 
introduction of a new land value tax in 2019 as Wales gains tax-raising powers under 
devolution (ap Gwilym, 2017). However, prices have fallen since 2015 and the Brexit vote 
(RICS/RAU, 2017). 
The Common Agricultural Policy is a significant influence upon farms in Wales 
 From 2012-2015, CAP Pillar 1 subsidies totalled between £205 and £250m per year, while 
Pillar 2 planned to spend an average of £70m/year. By far the largest spending element in 
Pillar 2 has been agri-environment schemes paid annually on land (Tir Gofal and Glastir). 
 Other smaller-budget RDP aids include a Sustainable Production Grant (2017), the Farm 
Business Grant (2017): a Knowledge Transfer and Innovation Scheme (2016), and the 
Food Business Investment Scheme (2017) for processing activities. The Young Entrants 
Support Scheme (YESS) operated in 2014-2016, targeting 100 young farmer entrants 
each year.  
 The CAP reform of 2013 required Wales to move from a historic-based Pillar 1 payment 
to an area-based payment. A WRO report in 2013 found: all “larger” farms (in terms of 
output) would receive reduced subsidy payment following the reform; most dairy farms 
would receive less than their historical entitlement, losing at least €50 per hectare; while 
just under half of small sheep farms would gain at least €50 per hectare. The biggest 
relative gainers would be very small farms but the gains in cash terms would be small; 
there was also much variation, with both dairy gainers and small farm losers. It is also 
 
  
39 
important to remember that very small farms and those in horticulture, indoor pigs and 
poultry do not receive this support. 
 As previously discussed, CAP support makes a big difference to farm business income on 
land-based livestock farms (sheep and beef), and it undoubtedly influences land prices 
indirectly, enabling owner-occupiers to use the equity in their land to buy more. It is likely 
to have a positive impact upon rural economic activity via the Pillar 2 schemes and 
indirectly through its income effect for farm families, though its impact on food prices is 
less clear, with different theories suggesting both inflationary and deflationary effects, 
depending upon how bargaining power works within food supply chains.  
 
Welsh Food and Drink is an important sector for rural economy and employment 
 Employment in the Food and Drink Sector (FD) in Wales is about 12% of total employment 
and 70% of this is in rural areas, concentrated in particular regions. (Welsh Agricultural 
Statistics, 2009). Wales has large numbers of small and very small food processing and 
manufacturing businesses, with only a few large food businesses. The large businesses 
have a strong effect on employment. For example, four major companies account for 85-
90% of the total cattle and sheep slaughter in Wales. Abattoirs in English border locations 
(e.g. Ludlow, Hereford and Shrewsbury) take substantial quantities of Welsh-reared stock 
(WG, undated). The Wales Food Strategy states that GVA of the food and drink sector in 
Wales, excluding agriculture, was estimated in 2005 as £3.5 billion, or 12% of total Wales 
GVA. 
 The Wales Food Strategy aims to encourage new forms of collaboration to increase the 
availability and consumption of Welsh produce, encouraging food producers to build 
capacity to supply a range of market outlets, from supermarkets to the public sector. Three 
WG-supported Food Centres provide businesses with advice and help to develop new 
products.  
Forestry in Wales – potential for growth 
Wales has a relatively low proportion of woodland – around 15% of land; of which 38% is 
publicly-owned and managed. Private woodland, much of which is owned by farmers, includes 
120,000 ha which is under-managed. 44% of forests are certified as sustainably managed 
(WG, 2012). 
 The gross output of Wales’ forest industry is estimated around £424 million; it supports 
8,100 - 9,500 rural jobs, mainly in sawmilling and processing. Current market prospects 
are positive: the relative weakness of sterling has favoured domestic production over 
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imports, and a much increased market share for UK timber. This, plus biomass 
development, have boosted prices, given limited supplies. (WG, 2014)  
 Reinstating management in neglected private woodlands would generate economic 
activity in rural areas and secure long term environmental and social benefits. Welsh 
forests are also an important venue for leisure and tourism (NRW, 2016). 
Natural environment 
A high-value, diverse resource showing some recovery from past pressures but 
vulnerable to future change 
 Wales’ rural areas contain a relatively high proportion (30% of the land area) of designated 
areas and sites, including SSSIs (12%) and Natura 2000 sites (SAC and SPA), as well as 
five AONBs and three National Parks. As the RDP puts it: ‘Wales is renowned for its 
dramatic and varied landscapes many of which have high ecological value and deliver 
important ecosystem services which underpin our wellbeing. All are working landscapes 
producing high quality food and supplying most of Wales and large parts of England with 
drinking water’ (WG, 2015). The Welsh rural environment is also internationally recognised 
for its historic value.  
 The value of the Welsh natural environment was negatively affected by change over more 
than a century. Economic development led to urbanisation, with industrialisation and then 
de-industrialisation in the south and north-east, and specialisation and intensification of 
agricultural production across the territory, as well as insensitive afforestation in two 
periods (following each world war), including in High Nature Value areas. Since the mid-
1980s many of these trends have subsided or been partly reversed. Acid rain and climate 
change have also driven change in recent decades: the latter poses a significant future 
challenge. 
 Climate change emissions in Wales have been falling in recent years, but more slowly 
than in the UK as a whole: in Wales, a higher share of greenhouse gas emissions come 
from the power sector, manufacturing and construction while agriculture only contributes 
around 4% (WG, 2012).  
 On biodiversity, the total number of priority species in Wales increased by 21 since 2002 
to 195 in 2008. Of those with information available, those classed as stable or increasing 
increased from 40% in 2002 to 52% in 2008, while those lost or declining decreased. The 
total number of priority habitats in Wales was 38 in 2008, and of those with information 
available, there was little change in those classed stable or increasing, while those 
declining increased 57% in 2002 to 62% in 2005, falling to 53% in 2008 (WG, 2012).  
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 On birds, trends in indices are generally negative. The index of widespread breeding birds 
began in 1994 and peaked at 113 for all species in 2000, then fell below 100 for the first 
time in 2009. The ‘other, urban and wetland’ species sub-group peaked at 136 in 2004 
before declining. The farmed habitats sub-group remained at or below 93 since 2006 and 
fell to a new low of 84 in 2009 (WG, 2012). 
 Wales Priority Action Framework states that 58% of Natura 2000 features on sites are in 
unfavourable condition, due predominantly to a number of pressures and threats:  
 access and recreation management;  
 air pollution; climate change;  
 diffuse water pollution; flood and coastal erosion risk management;  
 grazing and livestock management; habitat fragmentation;  
 non-native invasive species and pathogens;  
 man-made changes to hydraulic conditions;  
 marine litter; marine fisheries and  
 woodland management.’ (NRW, 2015).  
Terrestrial priority areas are lowland and upland peatlands; sand dunes; rivers and woodlands. 
Figure A4. State of SAC and SPA sites in Wales, NRW 2015 
 
 
 In respect of the historic environment, rural Wales has seen positive trends, although the 
data is now rather old. In 1996 and 2003, c.80 per cent of scheduled ancient monuments 
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were reported as stable, and around 10 per cent improved or greatly improved (in 
condition). Over the period there was an increase in superficial disturbance, invasive 
vegetation and scrub encroachment, probably due to ‘less intensive agriculture 
encouraged by agri-environment schemes’, but it was ‘more than offset by a reduction in 
the severe disturbance sometimes caused by intensive agriculture.’(Historic Wales, 2007) 
Trends are likely to have continued. 
 On public access, SoE Wales reported: ‘The proportion of footpaths and other rights of 
way surveyed which are easy to use in Wales increased from 41 per cent in 2005-06 to 55 
per cent in 2010-11.’ (WG, 2012) This implies that just under half of Public Rights Of Way 
were not easy to use, in 2011. For tranquillity, the indices are negative ‘Between 1997 and 
2009, there was a loss of Tranquil Areas of nearly 1,500km2’, over 6 per cent of the land 
area of Wales (WG, op.cit.). 
 In respect of water quality and the targets of the Water Framework Directive (WFD), Wales 
has a generally high level of biological and chemical quality in rivers, but groundwater 
sources have generally poorer quality. Only a small proportion of land in Wales – around 
the north-east border with England – is designated as  Nitrate Vulnerable under the 
Nitrates Directive, signifying relatively high N levels due to agriculture and reflecting the 
more intensive nature of livestock production (beef and dairy, indoor pigs and poultry) in 
this region. Positive trends of reduced water abstraction in Wales have been seen in recent 
years (NRW, 2016). 
 The Environment Act Wales 2016 set out a new strategy - elements most relevant to rural 
areas are: sustainable management of natural resources; collection and disposal of waste; 
flood and coastal erosion and land drainage. Sustainable management signals a new 
national natural resources policy (NNRP), the production of ‘area statements’ for all of 
Wales highlighting environmental priorities, and five-year ‘state of the natural environment’ 
reporting. 
In sum, environmental data and trends indicate a continuing need for enhanced management 
for the protection of natural resources and ecosystem services, and the reversal of declines 
in environmental quality. The interface with viable farming and forestry is critical as so much 
of the resource base and its service provision depends upon appropriate land management 
practices, and suffers equally from neglect or over-use. 
Summary of findings and implications 
The data indicates the heavy dependence of land use and management and the natural 
environment in Wales upon a large number of relatively small (in business terms) family farms, 
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whose financial survival relies significantly upon current CAP subsidy. However the rural 
economy is perhaps equally or more reliant upon public sector and service sector employers, 
notably tourism. It seems that vulnerability to Brexit-induced agricultural change is greatest in 
those remoter situations where small, less-diversified sheep farms dominate the landscape – 
e.g. North, West and Mid-Wales, whilst more diverse rural land users in the South-west, South 
and North-East appear more able to adapt to anticipated change. Declining land value could 
see various non-agricultural uses grow. Nonetheless, a wider economic downturn triggered 
by Brexit could lead to increased rural poverty and reduced service provision in the Valleys 
and in North Wales, in particular, while new opportunities for higher-value farming might arise 
in any areas close to main settlements. Tourism might see growth from both UK domestic and 
overseas markets, potentially benefiting Wales’ significant non-industrial coastline and 
designated landscapes. Forestry also seems likely to increase in economic significance, and 
there is also potential for growth in mid-sized food and drink firms. Social and economic 
vulnerability will negatively impact key resources including peatland and other semi-natural 
upland habitats, hedgerows and historic features but there could be new opportunities for 
enhanced coastal and forestry management linked to increased visitor spending and land use 
change.   
At the level of individual businesses and communities, vulnerability to different aspects of 
Brexit-induced change will vary considerably in relation to individual circumstances. Financial 
shocks in farming hit those with already marginal profitability but also tend to trigger crises 
among those who have borrowed heavily to invest (likely among larger capital-intensive farms 
e.g. dairy). Those nearing retirement age and without successors may suffer significant short-
term hardship, or may decide to sell up. Businesses with significant diversification enterprises 
are more likely to cope with downturns in farming; and households with other non-farm 
incomes may be as much affected by trends in other sectors. For example, significant 
investment by public and private sectors in housing and infrastructure renewal could help 
support rural adjustment and non-farm employment but if this is reduced by wider contraction 
in the economy linked to Brexit, its cushioning potential will be less. 
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The Public Policy Institute for Wales 
 
 
The Public Policy Institute for Wales improves policy making and delivery by commissioning 
and promoting the use of independent expert analysis and advice. The Institute is independent 
of government but works closely with policy makers to help develop fresh thinking about how 
to address strategic challenges and complex policy issues. It: 
 Works directly with Welsh Ministers to identify the evidence they need; 
 Signposts relevant research and commissions policy experts to provide additional analysis 
and advice where there are evidence gaps; 
 Provides a strong link between What Works Centres and policy makers in Wales; and   
 Leads a programme of research on What Works in Tackling Poverty. 
 
Note: In October 2017 the PPIW became part of the Wales Centre for Public Policy. The 
Centre builds on the success of PPIW, and will continue the Institute’s work of meeting Welsh 
Government Ministers’ evidence needs, alongside a new mission to support public services to 
access, generate, evaluate and apply evidence about what works to address key economic 
and social challenges. This assignment was commissioned for the final PPIW work 
programme.  
For further information please visit our website at www.wcpp.org.uk.   
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